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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 This case presents the question whether the true threats 
exception to speech protection under the First Amendment 
requires a jury to find the defendant subjectively intended his 
statements to be understood as threats.  Anthony Elonis 
challenges his jury conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), 
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arguing he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to 
be threatening.  In United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 
(3d Cir. 1991) we held a statement is a true threat when a 
reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be 
interpreted as a threat.  We consider whether the Supreme 
Court decision in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), 
overturns this standard by requiring a subjective intent to 
threaten. 
 
I. 
 In May 2010, Elonis’s wife of seven years moved out 
of their home with their two young children.  Following this 
separation, Elonis began experiencing trouble at work.  Elonis 
worked at Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom amusement 
park as an operations supervisor and a communications 
technician.  After his wife left, supervisors observed Elonis 
with his head down on his desk crying, and he was sent home 
on several occasions because he was too upset to work.   
 
 One of the employees Elonis supervised, Amber 
Morrissey, made five sexual harassment reports against him.  
According to Morrissey, Elonis came into the office where 
she was working alone late at night, and began to undress in 
front of her.  She left the building after he removed his shirt.  
Morrissey also reported another incident where Elonis made a 
minor female employee uncomfortable when he placed 
himself close to her and told her to stick out her tongue.  On 
October 17, 2010 Elonis posted on his Facebook page a 
photograph taken for the Dorney Park Halloween Haunt.  The 
photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to 
Morrissey’s neck.  Elonis added the caption “I wish” under 
the photograph.  Elonis’s supervisor saw the Facebook 
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posting and fired Elonis that same day. 
 
 Two days after he was fired, Elonis began posting 
violent statements on his Facebook page.  One post regarding 
Dorney Park stated: 
 
Moles. Didn’t I tell ya’ll I had several?  Ya’ll 
saying I had access to keys for the fucking 
gates, that I have sinister plans for all my 
friends and must have taken home a couple.  
Ya’ll think it’s too dark and foggy to secure 
your facility from a man as mad as me.  You 
see, even without a paycheck I’m still the main 
attraction.  Whoever thought the Halloween 
haunt could  
be so fucking scary? 
 Elonis also began posting statements about his 
estranged wife, Tara Elonis, including the following: “If I 
only knew then what I know now, I would have smothered 
your ass with a pillow, dumped your body in the back seat, 
dropped you off in Toad Creek, and made it look like a rape 
and murder.”  Several of the posts about Tara Elonis were in 
response to her sister’s status updates on Facebook.  For 
example, Tara Elonis’s sister posted her status update as: 
“Halloween costume shopping with my niece and nephew 
should be interesting.”  Elonis commented on this status 
update, writing, “Tell [their son] he should dress up as 
matricide for Halloween.  I don’t know what his costume 
would entail though.  Maybe [Tara Elonis’s] head on a stick?”  
Elonis also posted in October 2010: 
 
There’s one way to love you but a thousand 
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ways to kill you.  I’m not going to rest until 
your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying 
from all the little cuts.  Hurry up and die, bitch, 
so I can bust this nut all over your corpse from 
atop your shallow grave.  I used to be a nice guy 
but then you became a slut.  Guess it’s not your 
fault you liked your daddy raped you.   
So hurry up and die, bitch, so I can forgive you. 
 Based on these statements a state court issued Tara 
Elonis a Protection From Abuse order against Elonis on 
November 4, 2010.  Following the issuance of the state court 
Protection From Abuse order, Elonis posted several 
statements on Facebook expressing intent to harm his wife. 
On November 7 he wrote:1    
 
Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I 
want to kill my wife? 
It’s illegal. 
It’s indirect criminal contempt. 
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not 
allowed to say. 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then 
because I was just telling you that it’s illegal for 
me to say I want to kill my wife. 
I’m not actually saying it. 
I’m just letting you know that it’s illegal for me 
to say that. 
It’s kind of like a public service.  
I’m letting you know so that you don’t 
accidently go out and say something like that  
                                              
1 This statement was the basis of Count 2 of the indictment. 
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Um, what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to 
say I really, really think someone out there 
should kill my wife.  
That’s illegal.  
Very, very illegal.  
But not illegal to say with a mortar launcher.  
Because that’s its own sentence.  
It’s an incomplete sentence but it may have 
nothing to do with the sentence before that.  
So that’s perfectly fine.  
Perfectly legal.   
I also found out that it’s incredibly illegal, 
extremely illegal, to go on Facebook and say 
something like the best place to fire a mortar 
launcher at her house would be from the 
cornfield behind it because of easy access to a 
getaway road and you’d have a clear line of 
sight through the sun room. 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, wrecklessly, insanely illegal. 
Yet even more illegal to show an illustrated 
diagram. 
===[ __ ] =====house 
: : : : : : : ^ : : : : : : : : : : : :cornfield 
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :  
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :  
: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :  
######################getaway road 
Insanely illegal. 
Ridiculously, horribly felonious. 
Cause they will come to my house in the middle 
of the night and they will lock me up. 
Extremely against the law. 
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Uh, one thing that is technically legal to say is 
that we have a group that meets Fridays at my 
parent’s house and the password is sic simper 
tyrannis. 
 
Tara Elonis testified at trial that she took these statements 
seriously, saying, “I felt like I was being stalked.  I felt 
extremely afraid for mine and my children’s and my families’ 
lives.”  Trial Tr. 97, Oct. 19, 2011.  Ms. Elonis further 
testified that Elonis rarely listened to rap music, and that she 
had never seen Elonis write rap lyrics during their seven years 
of marriage.  She explained that the lyric form of the 
statements did not make her take the threats any less 
seriously. 
 
 On November 15 Elonis posted on his Facebook page: 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first place 
Me thinks the judge needs an education on true 
threat jurisprudence 
And prison time will add zeroes to my 
settlement 
Which you won’t see a lick 
Because you suck dog dick in front of children 
**** 
And if worse comes to worse 
I’ve got enough explosives 
to take care of the state police and the sheriff's 
department 
[link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org] 
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This statement was the basis both of Count 2, threats to 
Elonis’s wife, and Count 3, threats to local law enforcement.  
A post the following day on November 16 involving an 
elementary school was the basis of Count 4: 
 
That’s it, I’ve had about enough 
I’m checking out and making a name for myself 
Enough elementary schools in a ten mile radius 
to initiate the most heinous school shooting ever 
imagined 
And hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a 
kindergarten class 
The only question is . . . which one? 
 
 By this point FBI Agent Denise Stevens was 
monitoring Elonis’s public Facebook postings, because 
Dorney Park contacted the FBI claiming Elonis had posted 
threats against Dorney Park and its employees on his 
Facebook page.  After reading these and other Facebook posts 
by Elonis, Agent Stevens and another FBI agent went to 
Elonis’s house to interview him.  When the agents knocked 
on his door, Elonis’s father answered and told the agents 
Elonis was sleeping.  The agents waited several minutes until 
Elonis came to the door wearing a t-shirt, jeans, and no shoes.  
Elonis asked the agents if they were law enforcement and 
asked if he was free to go.  After the agents identified 
themselves and told him he was free to go, Elonis went inside 
and closed the door.  Later that day, Elonis posted the 
following on Facebook: 
 
You know your shit’s ridiculous 
when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
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Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch 
ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat 
Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms 
of her partner 
 
[laughter] 
 
So the next time you knock, you best be serving 
a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert 
while you’re at it 
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ 
a bomb 
Why do you think it took me so long to get 
dressed with no shoes on? 
I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and 
pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all 
goin’ 
 
[BOOM!] 
These statements were the basis of Count 5 of the indictment.  
After she observed this post on Elonis’s Facebook page, 
Agent Stevens contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 
 
II. 
 Elonis was arrested on December 8, 2010 and charged 
with transmitting in interstate commerce communications 
containing a threat to injure the person of another in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  The grand jury indicted Elonis on five 
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counts of making threatening communications: Count 1 
threats to patrons and employees of Dorney Park & 
Wildwater Kingdom, Count 2 threats to his wife, Count 3 
threats to employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and 
Berks County Sheriff’s Department, Count 4 threats to a 
kindergarten class, and Count 5 threats to an FBI agent.   
 
 Elonis moved to dismiss the indictments against him, 
contending the Supreme Court held in Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 347-48 (2003) that a subjective intent to threaten 
was required under the true threat exception to the First 
Amendment and that his statements were not threats but were 
protected speech.  The District Court denied the motion to 
dismiss because even if the subjective intent standard applied, 
Elonis’s intent and the attendant circumstances showing 
whether or not the statements were true threats were questions 
of fact for the jury.  United States v. Elonis, No. 11-13, 2011 
WL 5024284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011). 
 
 Elonis testified in his own defense at trial.  A jury 
convicted Elonis on Counts 2 through 5, and the court 
sentenced him to 44 months’ imprisonment followed by three 
years supervised release.   Elonis filed a post-trial Motion to 
Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice under Rule 12(b)(3); and 
for New Trial under Rule 33(a), to Arrest Judgment under 
Rule 34(b) and/or Dismissal under Rule 29(c).  The District 
Court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the 
indictment correctly tracked the language of the statute and 
stated the nature of the threat, the date of the threat and the 
victim of the threat.  The court also stated the objective intent 
standard conformed with Third Circuit precedent.  The court 
found the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the 
statements in Count 3 and Count 5 were true threats.  Finally, 
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the court held that the jury instruction presuming 
communications over the internet were transmitted through 
interstate commerce was supported by our precedent in 
United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
III.2 
A. 
 Elonis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for 
“transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or 
any threat to injure the person of another . . . .”  Elonis 
contends the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the 
standard of a true threat.  The court gave the following jury 
instruction: 
 
A statement is a true threat when a defendant 
intentionally makes a statement in a context or 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review statutory interpretations and 
conclusions of law de novo.  Kosma, 951 F.2d at 553.  We 
exercise plenary review over the sufficiency of indictments. 
United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  
“We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when 
deciding whether a jury verdict rests on legally sufficient 
evidence.”  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1998).  Because Elonis failed to object to the jury instructions 
at trial, we review whether the jury instructions stated the 
correct legal standard for plain error. United States v. Lee, 
612 F.3d 170, 191 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would 
be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an  
intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life 
of an individual. 
 
Trial Tr. 127, Oct. 20, 2011.  Elonis posits that the Supreme 
Court decision in Virginia v. Black requires that a defendant 
subjectively intend to threaten, and overturns the reasonable 
speaker standard we articulated in United States v. Kosma, 
951 F.3d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
In United States v. Kosma, we held a true threat 
requires that 
 
the defendant intentionally make a statement, 
written or oral, in a context or under such 
circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be 
interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm 
upon or to take the life of the President, and that 
the statement not be the result of mistake, 
duress, or coercion.  
 
Id. at 557 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877-
78 (9th Cir. 1969) (emphasis omitted)).  We rejected a 
subjective intent requirement that the defendant “intended at 
least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious 
one.” Id. at 558 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 
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35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring)).  We found “any 
subjective test potentially frustrates the purposes of section 
871—to prevent not only actual threats on the President’s life, 
but also the harmful consequences which flow from such 
threats.”  Id. (explaining “it would make prosecution of these 
threats significantly more difficult”).  We have held the same 
“knowingly and willfully” mens rea Kosma analyzed under 
18 U.S.C. § 871, threats against the president, applies to 
§ 875(c).  United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (holding “the government bore only the burden of 
proving that Himelwright acted knowingly and willfully when 
he placed the threatening telephone calls and that those calls 
were reasonably perceived as threatening bodily injury”).  
Since our precedent is clear, the question is whether the 
Supreme Court decision in Virginia v. Black overturned this 
standard. 
 
 The Supreme Court first articulated the true threats 
exception to speech protected under the First Amendment in 
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).  During a rally 
opposing the Vietnam war, Watts told the crowd, “I am not 
going.  If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want 
to get in my sights is L.B.J.”  Id. at 706 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court reversed his conviction for 
making a threat against the president because the statement 
was “political hyperbole,” rather than a true threat.  Id. at 708.  
The Court articulated three factors supporting its finding: 1. 
the context was a political speech; 2. the statement was 
“expressly conditional”; and 3. “the reaction of the listeners” 
who “laughed after the statement was made.”  Id. at 707-08.  
The Court did not address the true threats exception again 
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until Virginia v. Black in 2003.3 
 
 In Virginia v. Black the Court considered a Virginia 
statute that banned burning a cross with the “intent of 
intimidating” and provided “[a]ny such burning of a cross 
shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a 
person or group of persons.”  538 U.S. at 348 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court reviewed three 
separate convictions of defendants under the statute and 
concluded that intimidating cross burning could be proscribed 
as a true threat under the First Amendment.  Id. at 363.  But 
the prima facie evidence provision violated due process, 
because it permitted a jury to convict whenever a defendant 
exercised his or her right to not put on a defense.  Id. at 364-
65. 
 
 The Court reviewed the historic and contextual 
meanings behind cross burning, and found it conveyed a 
political message, a cultural message, and a threatening 
message, depending on the circumstances.  Id. at 354-57.  The 
Court then described the true threat exception generally 
before analyzing the Virginia statute:  
 
“True threats” encompass those statements 
where the speaker means to communicate a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act 
of unlawful violence to a particular individual 
or group of individuals.  See Watts v. United 
States, supra, at 708 . . . (“political hyperbole” 
                                              
3 The Court did discuss the constitutional limits on banning 
“fighting words” in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 
388 (1992). 
15 
 
is not a true threat); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S., at 388. . . .  The speaker need not 
actually intend to carry out the threat.  Rather, a 
prohibition on true threats “protect[s] 
individuals from the fear of violence” and 
“from the disruption that fear engenders,” in 
addition to protecting people “from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur.”  Ibid.  Intimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word 
is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a 
threat to a person or group of persons with the 
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily 
harm or death.  Respondents do not contest that 
some cross burnings fit within this meaning of 
intimidating speech, and rightly so.  As noted in 
Part II, supra, the history of cross burning in 
this country shows that cross burning is often 
intimidating, intended to create a pervasive fear 
in victims that they are a  
target of  violence. 
Id. at 359-60 (citation omitted).  Elonis contends that this 
definition of true threats means that the speaker must both 
intend to communicate and intend for the language to threaten 
the victim.4  But the Court did not have occasion to make 
                                              
4 Elonis also points to the passage “[i]ntimidation in the 
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of 
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or 
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear 
of bodily harm or death.”  Black, 538 U.S. at 360.  But this 
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such a sweeping holding, because the challenged Virginia 
statute already required a subjective intent to intimidate.  We 
do not infer from the use of the term “intent” that the Court 
invalidated the objective intent standard the majority of 
circuits applied to true threats.5  Instead, we read “statements 
where the speaker means to communicate a serious 
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence” to mean that the speaker must intend to make the 
communication.  It would require adding language the Court 
did not write to read the passage as “statements where the 
speaker means to communicate [and intends the statement to 
be understood as] a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence.”  Id. at 359.  This is not what the 
Court wrote, and it is inconsistent with the logic animating 
the true threats exception. 
 The “prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals 
from the fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear 
engenders,’ in addition to protecting people ‘from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’”  Id. at 
                                                                                                     
sentence explains when intimidation can be a true threat, and 
does not define when threatening language is a true threat. 
5 See, e.g., United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 20-21 (1st 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 122 (2d 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1066 (4th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 80-81 (5th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 
(8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1091 
(10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 
965 (11th Cir. 1983); Metz v. Dep’t of Treasury, 780 F.2d 
1001, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
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360 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).  Limiting the definition 
of true threats to only those statements where the speaker 
subjectively intended to threaten would fail to protect 
individuals from “the fear of violence” and the “disruption 
that fear engenders,” because it would protect speech that a 
reasonable speaker would understand to be threatening.  Id. 
 
 Elonis further contends the unconstitutionality of the 
prima facie evidence provision in Black indicates a subjective 
intent to threaten is required.  The Court found the fact that 
the defendant burned a cross could not be prima facie 
evidence of intent to intimidate.  Id. at 364-65.  The Court 
explained that while cross burning was often employed as 
intimidation or a threat of physical violence against others, it 
could also function as a symbol of solidarity for those within 
the white supremacist movement.  Id. at 365-66.  Less 
frequently, crosses had been burned outside of the white 
supremacist context, such as stage performances.  Id. at 366.  
Since the burning of a cross could have a constitutionally-
protected political message as well as a threatening message, 
the prima facie evidence provision failed to distinguish 
protected speech from unprotected threats.  Furthermore, the 
prima facie evidence provision denied defendants the right to 
not put on a defense, since the prosecution did not have to 
produce any evidence of intent to intimidate, which was an 
element of the crime.  Id. at 364-65. 
 
 We do not find that the unconstitutionality of 
Virginia’s prima facie evidence provision means the true 
threats exception requires a subjective intent to threaten.  
First, the prima facie evidence provision did not allow the 
factfinder to consider the context to construe the meaning of 
the conduct, id. at 365-66, whereas the reasonable person 
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standard does encompass context to determine whether the 
statement was a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily 
harm.  Second, cross-burning is conduct that may or may not 
convey a meaning, as opposed to the language in this case 
which has inherent meaning in addition to the meaning 
derived from context.  Finally, the prima facie evidence 
provision violated the defendant’s due process rights to not 
put on a defense, because the defendant could be convicted 
even when the prosecution had not proven all the elements of 
the crime.  Id.  That is not an issue here because the 
government had to prove that a reasonable person would 
foresee Elonis’s statements would be understood as threats.   
 
 The majority of circuits that have considered this 
question have not found the Supreme Court decision in Black 
to require a subjective intent to threaten.  See United States v. 
White, 670 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A careful reading 
of the requirements of § 875(c), together with the definition 
from Black, does not, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion 
that Black introduced a specific-intent-to-threaten 
requirement into § 875(c) . . . .”); United States v. Jeffries, 
692 F.3d 473, 479 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he position reads too 
much into Black.”);  United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 
332-33 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 107 (2012) 
(noting the objective test had been applied many times after 
Black) 6; United States v. Nicklas, 713 F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 
                                              
6 The Eighth Circuit cited the following cases applying an 
objective standard after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Black:  
 
United States v. Beale, 620 F.3d 856, 865 (8th 
Cir. 2010) . . . ; United States v. Armel, 585 
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2013) (quoting extensively from Jeffries, the court 
“concluded § 875(c) does not require the government to prove 
a defendant specifically intended his or her statements to be 
threatening”).   
 
 The Fourth Circuit in United States v. White 
considered the same criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), and 
found the Court in Black “gave no indication it was 
redefining a general intent crime such as § 875(c) to be a 
specific intent crime.”  670 F.3d at 509.  The Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that Black had analyzed a statute that included a 
specific intent element, whereas § 875(c) had consistently 
been applied as a general intent statute.  Id. at 508. The court 
further distinguished Black by noting the multiple meanings 
of cross-burning necessitated a finding of intent to distinguish 
protected speech from true threats.  Id. at 511.  The court in 
White found this same problem did not exist for threatening 
language because it has no First Amendment value.  Id.  
Finally, the court found the general intent standard for § 
875(c) offenses did not chill “statements of jest or political 
                                                                                                     
F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying an 
objective test in a true threat analysis); Porter v. 
Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–
17 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]o lose the protection of 
the First Amendment and be lawfully punished, 
the threat must be intentionally or knowingly 
communicated to either the object of the threat 
or a third person.”); United States v. Zavrel, 384 
F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying an 
objective test in a true threat analysis). 
 
Mabie, 663 F.3d at 332. 
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hyperbole” because “any such statements will, under the 
objective test, always be protected by the consideration of the 
context and of how a reasonable recipient would understand 
the statement.”  Id. at 509.7 
 
 In United States v. Jeffries the Sixth Circuit agreed that 
Black does not require a subjective intent to threaten to 
convict under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  692 F.3d at 479.  Because 
Black interpreted a statute that already had a subjective intent 
requirement, the Sixth Circuit found the Court was not 
presented with the question whether an objective intent 
standard is constitutional.  Id.  Jeffries also found that the 
Court’s ruling on the prima facie evidence provision did not 
address the specific intent question because “the statute 
lacked any standard at all.”  Id. at 479-80.  Like the Fourth 
Circuit in White, the Sixth Circuit explained that the prima 
facie evidence provision failed to distinguish between 
protected speech and threats by not allowing for consideration 
of any contextual factors.  Id. at 480.  In contrast, “[t]he 
reasonable-person standard winnows out protected speech 
because, instead of ignoring context, it forces jurors to 
examine the circumstances in which a statement is made.” Id.   
 The Ninth Circuit took a different view, and found the 
true threats definition in Black requires the speaker both 
intend to communicate and “intend for his language to 
threaten the victim.”  United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 
631 (9th Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 
unconstitutionality of the prima facie provision meant that the 
Court required a finding of intent to threaten for all speech 
                                              
7 The Fourth Circuit test focuses on the reasonable recipient, 
but our test asks whether a reasonable speaker would foresee 
the statement would be understood as a threat.  
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labeled as “true threats,” and not just cross burning.  Id. at 
631-32 (“[T]he prima facie evidence provision rendered the 
statute facially unconstitutional because it effectively 
eliminated the intent requirement.”).   “We are therefore 
bound to conclude that speech may be deemed unprotected by 
the First Amendment  as a ‘true threat’ only upon proof that 
the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat.”  Id. 
at 633.8   
 
 Regardless of the state of the law in the Ninth Circuit, 
we find that Black does not alter our precedent.  We agree 
with the Fourth Circuit that Black does not clearly overturn 
the objective test the majority of circuits applied to § 875(c).  
Black does not say that the true threats exception requires a 
subjective intent to threaten.  Furthermore, our standard does 
require a finding of intent to communicate.  The jury had to 
find Elonis “knowingly and willfully” transmitted a 
“communication containing . . . [a] threat to injure the person 
of another.”  18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  A threat is made 
“knowingly” as when it is “made intentionally and not [as] 
the result of mistake, coercion or duress.”  Kosma, 951 F.2d 
at 557 (quotation omitted).  A threat is made willfully when 
“a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would 
be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict 
bodily harm.”  Id. (citation and emphasis omitted).  This 
objective intent standard protects non-threatening speech 
                                              
8 Similarly, in United States v. Bagdasarian the Ninth Circuit 
wrote in dicta that, in light of Black, “[a] statement that the 
speaker does not intend as a threat is afforded constitutional 
protection and cannot be held criminal.”  652 F.3d 1113, 1122 
(9th Cir. 2011).  
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while addressing the harm caused by true threats.  
Accordingly, the Kosma objective intent standard applies to 
this case and the District Court did not err in instructing the 
jury. 
 
B. 
 Elonis contends the indictment was insufficient 
because it did not quote the language of the allegedly 
threatening statements.  An indictment “must be a plain, 
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 
constituting the offense charged.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).  
An indictment is sufficient when it “(1) contains the elements 
of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises 
the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and (3) 
allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what extent he 
may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of a 
subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 
314, 321 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).  We 
have found an indictment is sufficient “where it informs the 
defendant of the statute he is charged with violating, lists the 
elements of a violation under the statute, and specifies the 
time period during which the violations occurred.”  United 
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 595 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 422 (2012).   
 In Huet we found an indictment for aiding and abetting 
a felon in possession of a firearm was sufficient because it 
alleged the previous felony conviction of the principal, the 
time period of the violation and the specific weapon involved, 
and alleged the defendant “knowingly aided and abetted 
Hall’s possession of that firearm.”  Id. at 596.  “No more was 
required to allow Huet to prepare her defense and invoke 
double jeopardy.” Id.   
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 The Eighth Circuit considered an indictment that did 
not include the verbatim contents of a letter, the date it was 
written, or the name of the author.  Keys v. United States, 126 
F.2d 181, 184-85 (8th Cir. 1942).  The indictment for 
communicating a threat to injure with the intent to extort 
merely stated the letter threatened to harm the reputation of 
the victim with intent to extort.  Id. at 182-83.  Since the 
indictment summarized the contents of the letter, provided the 
date it was mailed and the name of the addressee, the Eighth 
Circuit found there could be no confusion as to the elements 
and subject of the crime.  Id. at 185 (“The fact that the 
defendant upon reading the indictment recognized the letter 
referred to and made no objection to the description at the 
time indicates the want of merit in his present criticism.”). 
 
 To find a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) a defendant 
must transmit in interstate or foreign commerce a 
communication containing a threat to injure or kidnap a 
person.  18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Here the indictment on Count 2 
stated: 
 
On or about November 6, 2010, through on or 
about November 15, 2010, in Bethlehem, in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, 
defendant ANTHONY DOUGLAS ELONIS 
knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate 
and foreign commerce, via a computer and the 
Internet, a communication to others, that is, a 
communication containing a threat to injure the 
person of another, specifically, a threat to injure 
and kill T.E., a person known to the grand jury.  
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In violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Section 875(c). 
 
The indictment on the other counts was identical, but stated 
each date of the threat, the nature of the threat, and the 
subjects of the threat.  Count 3 alleged “a threat to injure 
employees of the Pennsylvania State Police and the Berks 
County Sheriff’s Department”; Count 4 alleged “a threat to 
injure a kindergarten class of elementary school children”; 
and Count 5 alleged “a threat to injure an agent of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.”  Elonis contends the indictment was 
deficient because they did not include the allegedly 
threatening statements. 
 
 The indictment was sufficient because the counts 
describe the elements of the violation, the nature of the threat, 
the subject of the threat, and the time period of the alleged 
violation.  For example, Count Four alleged defendant 
communicated over the internet on November 16, 2010 “a 
threat to injure a kindergarten class.”  If Elonis had already 
been charged with this statement, the indictment provided 
enough information to challenge a subsequent prosecution.  
Based on the indictment, defendant was notified he needed to 
dispute that the statement was a threat, that he communicated 
the statement, and that he transmitted the statement through 
interstate commerce.  Moreover, like the defendant in Keys, 
Elonis was able to identify which internet communications 
the indictment described, since he did not raise the issue until 
after trial.9 
                                              
9 Elonis did challenge the sufficiency of the indictment prior 
to trial, but only on constitutional grounds.  The indictment 
did not include a subjective intent to threaten.   
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C. 
 Elonis contends there was insufficient evidence to 
convict on Counts 3 and 5 of the indictment because the 
statements on which they were based were not threats.  “A 
claim of insufficiency of evidence places a very heavy burden 
on the appellant.”  United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 
(3d Cir. 1995).  “[T]he relevant question is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 
1. 
 Elonis contends Count 3 was based on a conditional 
statement, which he asserts cannot be a true threat.  In Watts 
the Supreme Court found the conditional nature of 
defendant’s statement to be one of the three factors 
demonstrating it was not a true threat.  Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 
(“Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional 
nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do 
not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.”).  Elonis 
posted the following on his Facebook page: 
Fold up your PFA and put it in your pocket 
Is it thick enough to stop a bullet? 
Try to enforce an Order 
That was improperly granted in the first place 
Me thinks the judge needs an education on true 
threat jurisprudence 
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And prison time will add zeroes to my 
settlement 
Which you won’t see a lick 
Because you suck dog dick in front of children 
**** 
And if worse comes to worse 
I’ve got enough explosives 
to take care of the state police and the sheriff’s 
department 
[link: Freedom of Speech, www.wikipedia.org]  
 We considered the impact of conditional statements on 
the true threat analysis in Kosma, 951 F.2d at 554.  We found 
that Watts did not hold conditional statements can never be 
true threats.  Id. at 554 n.8 (“Even if Kosma’s threats were 
truly conditional, they could still be considered true threats.”).  
We explained the conditional statements in Watts “were 
dependent on the defendant’s induction into the armed 
forces—a condition which the defendant stated would never 
happen.”  Id. at 554.  Because the defendant’s threats in 
Kosma stated a precise time and place for carrying out the 
alleged threats, they were true threats.  Id. 
 
 Here the District Court found that a reasonable jury 
could find the statement to be a true threat.  United States v. 
Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d 335, 346 (E.D. Pa. 2012).  Unlike in 
Watts, Elonis did not vow the condition precedent would 
never occur.  However, this case is also unlike Kosma, where 
the statement included a particular time and place.  Elonis’s 
statement only conveys a vague timeline or condition.  But, 
taken as a whole, a jury could have found defendant was 
threatening to use explosives on officers who “[t]ry to enforce 
an Order” of protection that was granted to his wife.  Since 
27 
 
there is no rule that a conditional statement cannot be a true 
threat—the words and context can demonstrate whether the 
statement was a serious expression of intent to harm—and we 
give substantial deference to a jury’s verdict, there was not 
insufficient evidence for the jury to find the statement was a 
threat.   
 
2. 
 Defendant contends that the statement on which Count 
5 is based is a description of past conduct, not a future intent 
to harm:  
 
You know your shit’s ridiculous 
when you have the FBI knockin’ at yo’ door 
Little Agent Lady stood so close 
Took all the strength I had not to turn the bitch 
ghost 
Pull my knife, flick my wrist, and slit her throat 
Leave her bleedin’ from her jugular in the arms 
of her partner 
 
[laughter] 
 
So the next time you knock, you best be serving 
a warrant 
And bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives expert 
while you’re at it 
Cause little did y’all know, I was strapped wit’ 
a bomb 
Why do you think it took me so long to get 
dressed with no shoes on? 
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I was jus’ waitin’ for y’all to handcuff me and 
pat me down 
Touch the detonator in my pocket and we’re all 
goin’ 
 
[BOOM!] 
 A threat under § 875(c) is a communication 
“expressing an intent to inflict injury in the present or future.”  
United States v. Stock, No. 12-2914, slip op. at 13 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 26, 2013).  It was possible for a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the statement “the next time you knock, best be 
serving a warrant [a]nd bring yo’ SWAT and an explosives 
expert” coupled with the past reference to a bomb was a 
threat to use explosives against the agents “the next time.”  
Indeed, the phrase “the next time” refers to the future, not a 
past event.  Accordingly, a reasonable jury could have found 
the statement was a true threat.  
 
D. 
 Elonis contends the jury instruction stating 
communications that travel over the internet necessarily travel 
in interstate commerce violated his due process rights because 
the government was required to prove interstate transmission 
as an element of the crime.  The District Court instructed the 
jury: “Because of the interstate nature of the Internet, if you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the 
Internet in communicating a threat, then that communication 
traveled in interstate commerce.” Trial Tr. 126, Oct. 11, 2011.  
 
 In United States v. MacEwan we explained the 
difference between interstate transmission and interstate 
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commerce.  445 F.3d 237, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
defendant in MacEwan contended the government failed to 
prove he received child pornography through interstate 
commerce because a Comcast witness testified it was 
impossible to know whether a particular transmission traveled 
through computer servers located entirely within 
Pennsylvania, or to any other server in the United States.  Id. 
at 241-42.  “[W]e conclude[d] that because of the very 
interstate nature of the Internet, once a user submits a 
connection request to a website server or an image is 
transmitted from the website server back to [the] user, the 
data has traveled in interstate commerce.”  Id. at 244.  
“Having concluded that the Internet is an instrumentality and 
channel of interstate commerce . . . .  [i]t is sufficient that 
MacEwan downloaded those images from the Internet, a 
system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 245. 
 
 Elonis distinguishes MacEwan by stating that in that 
case the government presented evidence on how the internet 
worked.  But the government’s evidence in MacEwan did not 
show that any one of the defendant’s internet transmissions 
traveled outside of Pennsylvania.10  We found that fact to be 
irrelevant to the question of interstate commerce because 
submitting data on the internet necessarily means the data 
travels in interstate commerce.  Id. at 241.  Instead, we held 
                                              
10 Notably, the government did present testimony on how 
Facebook works.  A computer forensic expert, Michael 
Moore, testified about privacy settings and that when a 
Facebook account is made public the postings can be seen by 
“whoever has access to it through the internet throughout the 
world.”  Trial Tr. 15-17, Oct. 17, 2011.  
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“[i]t is sufficient that [the defendant] downloaded those 
images from the Internet.”  Id. at 245.  Based on our 
conclusion that proving internet transmission alone is 
sufficient to prove transmission through interstate commerce, 
the District Court did not err in instructing the jury. 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will uphold Elonis’s 
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).  
